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Abstract: This study provides a methodology with which to estimate the 
volumes and revenues of the illicit cigarette market at the subnational level. It 
applies the methodology to Italy for a four-year period (2009-2012), enabling 
assessment of the prevalence of the illicit trade across years and regions. 
Notwithstanding the alleged importance of mafias, the results provide a more 
complex picture of the Italian illicit tobacco market. The maximum total revenues 
from the ITTP increased from €0.5 bn in 2009 to €1.2 bn in 2012. The prevalence 
of illicit cigarettes varies significantly across regions, due to the proximity to 
countries with cheaper cigarettes and the possible occurrence of other crime 
opportunities. Understanding of these factors is crucial for the development of 
appropriate policies against the ITTP. The methodology provided may be 
applicable to all other EU countries, providing detailed, yearly estimates of the 
illicit market at the subnational level.  
Keywords: illicit trade in tobacco products; cigarette smuggling; counterfeiting; 
illicit whites; mafias; criminal markets; estimating criminal revenues. 
Introduction 
The illicit trade in tobacco products (hereinafter ITTP) comprises a variety of illegal 
activities, extending beyond the most popular categories of smuggling and 
counterfeiting. The most common definition of the ITTP (Article 1 of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control of the World Health Organization), is broad and 
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somewhat tautological.
1
 In fact, the ITTP encompasses different conducts, from 
criminal offences to administrative violations: namely, contraband (transport or sale of 
tobacco products from a country without paying taxes or violating laws that control the 
import and the export); counterfeiting (illegal production of goods with a trademark or a 
copy of the latter without the owners’ permission); “cheap whites” or “illicit whites” 
(cigarettes produced in one country in order to be illegally exported to another country 
where the same products are not distributed in the legal market); “unbranded” tobacco 
(hand-rolled or semi-finished tobacco, or also loose tobacco leaves with no labelling or 
health warning); bootlegging (the purchase of legal tobacco in low-tax countries for 
illegal resale in countries with higher taxes); and illegal production (products not 
declared to the tax authorities).
2
 These different activities are inherently associated with 
the fact that tobacco products are legal commodities available in a market context. 
The tobacco market is a dual market with a legal and illegal side.
3
 The 
interaction between the two sides is due to numerous socio-economic, cultural and 
normative factors, including activities to combat trafficking.
4
 In the legal market, 
tobacco products are subject to strict regulation and high taxation due to their serious 
consequences for human health. Despite intensive regulation, the tobacco market is a 
truly global one, with multinational companies, centralized manufacturing (driven by 
economies of scale and the relatively easy transport of the products), and important 
import-export dynamics. The functioning of the legal tobacco market inevitably affects 
the illicit trade as well.  
For the above-mentioned reasons, the ITTP is a problem in various respects. It 
affects tobacco control policies, supplying cheap and often uncontrolled tobacco 
products and jeopardizing efforts to reduce smoking; it deprives governments of 
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revenues from taxation; it impacts on the economy by unfairly competing with the 
sectors of tobacco manufacturing, wholesale and retail distribution.
5
  
This study provides a methodology for the production of subnational (nuts-2
6
 
level) estimates of the volumes and revenues of the ITTP and particularly of illicit 
cigarettes.
7
 It applies the estimation methodology to Italy, which is an interesting case 
study because of the traditional role of tobacco smuggling for the Italian mafias and the 
evolution of the ITTP in recent decades. The estimates for Italy show that the increase 
of the illicit market in the last four years is due to a generalized growth across all 
regions between 2009 and 2011. In 2012, the increase was mostly driven by three 
regions. Calculation of the revenues at the retail level from the ITTP point out that the 
allegation that the Italian mafias are earning up to €0.9 bn is unfounded.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows: the first section briefly reviews 
the characteristics of the illicit trade in tobacco products and the existing estimates. The 
second section focuses on Italy, analyzing the evolution of the ITTP in the past years 
and presenting qualitative and quantitative information available today. The third 
section outlines the methodology used for this study as well as its limitations, while the 
fourth section presents and discusses the results. The last section concludes the article. 
The illicit trade in tobacco products: characteristics and estimates 
Demand and supply 
The demand for illicit tobacco products is associated with several factors. In 
particular, several studies have shown that the main factor determining the consumption 
of illicit tobacco is the price, which is significantly lower than that of the legitimate 
products. The price of illicit products may vary by country, product, and other 
conditions of sale, and it ranges from 25% to 90% less than that of legitimate products.
8
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In addition to price differentials, the literature has shown that smokers in low socio-
economic conditions are more likely to consume illicit tobacco.
9
 Furthermore, in some 
countries and areas where smuggling is a common practice, the consumption of illicit 
cigarettes may be regarded as a socially acceptable practice.
10
  
Also the supply of illicit tobacco is strongly influenced by the dynamics of 
prices and taxes. Cigarettes are in fact the commodity with the highest tax value by 
weight, and the retail price is mainly determined by taxes, which may even exceed 70-
80% of the same.
11
 The illicit market aims to minimize or avoid taxes paid on products, 
and this makes it a business that can generate high profits.
12
 Other factors favoring the 
development of the illicit tobacco market include: the availability of cheap (including 
illegal) tobacco products, with areas close to cheaper cigarettes being more vulnerable 
to various forms of tax avoidance (both licit and illicit);
13
 the dynamics and regulation 
of the legal market, e.g. the transit trade regime allowing the suspension of taxation for 
exported/imported commodities transiting through third countries;
14
 illicit practices by 
some manufacturers, e.g. the supply of quantities of cigarettes exceeding the domestic 
demand to some countries from where the products are subsequently smuggled 
exploiting corruption and international trade schemes;
15
 and the adoption of effective 
prevention policies and criminal enforcement actions.
16
 Although a high level of 
taxation may be the initial incentive for the supply of illicit tobacco, these other factors 
are crucial for the development and maintenance of the illicit trade. 
The actors of the ITTP 
The literature has shown the presence of a variety of actors involved in the illicit 
tobacco market. First, the tobacco industry has been repeatedly reported for contributing 
to the smuggling of tobacco products. In many countries, governments have taken legal 
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action for the fiscal losses caused by the industry’s exploitation of transit trade resulting 
in significant smuggling of tobacco products.
17
 The pressure on the industry has led 
manufacturers to implement better controls on the supply chain and on the destination 
countries.
18
 Another result was the signature of cooperation agreements with the 
authorities of various countries.
19
 The agreements have improved the prevention and 
fight against large-scale tobacco smuggling, introducing systems to track and trace 
tobacco products and imposing payment on manufacturers in case the authorities seize 
products which are not counterfeit.
20
  
Second, much of the criminological literature reports that those involved in the illicit 
tobacco trade are mainly small groups or independent criminal entrepreneurs.
21
 These 
studies, primarily in the Netherlands, Germany, Greece and the United Kingdom, 
maintain that large organizations, structured and stable over time, should be considered 
exceptional in the illicit tobacco market. Even in the presence of quite extensive and 
organized criminal networks, as in the case of groups of Vietnamese origin in Berlin, 
there were no elements that suggested the creation of large coalitions or groups with an 
elaborate structure able to achieve monopoly on the illicit market by, for example, the 
frequent use of violence.
22
  
Finally, several sources report the involvement of organized crime and terrorist 
groups in the illicit tobacco trade. These groups are attracted by the possibility of high 
profits with a low risk of identification and conviction. They take advantage of the 
international exchange networks already used, for example, to traffic drugs, arms and 
human beings.
23
 According to various sources, stable and organized criminal groups, 
such as the Italian mafias, Eastern European or Asian criminal organizations are present 
in different phases of the trade. These groups participate in the smuggling,
24
 forgery,
 25
 
storing and processing of illicit tobacco.
26
 In regard to terrorist organizations, some 
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studies have argued for their involvement in illicit tobacco.
 27
 However, these analyses 
are based on a limited number of cases and are often conducted on heterogeneous 
sources, such as official reports and articles in the media, which may over-emphasize 
the role of criminal and terrorist organizations. Some scholars have therefore argued 
that the involvement of terrorists and mafias is rare, and that in any case they are unable 
to monopolize such a large illicit market.
28
 
Estimates of the ITTP 
Several studies have estimated the size of the illicit tobacco market at the global, 
continental and national level. The availability of studies is probably due to the impact 
that illicit trade can have on legitimate manufacturers and tobacco control policies, and 
to the importance that taxes on tobacco products have for governments. This promotes 
estimations of the size and the fiscal impact of the illicit market to monitor and facilitate 
action against it. However, the agendas of the estimators may have an influence on the 
estimation process: manufacturers may prefer high figures to get more attention by the 
law enforcement agencies, policymakers may want to minimize the issue as this may 
indicate problems of efficiency or corruption, and tobacco control activist may either 
prefer higher, e.g. to point out the manufacturers’ role in the ITTP, or lower numbers, 
e.g. to minimize the unwanted effects of tobacco control measures.
29
  
Despite the abundance of estimations, there is no general consensus on the 
methodology. Existing studies are often based on various sources collected at irregular 
intervals. In particular, the approaches used have focused, for example, on the 
difference between exports and imports declared, or official/expert estimates, the link 
between sales and official prices in neighboring countries, consumer surveys, and 
observational data collection (inspection of packs and other products).
30
 In addition to 
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the above mentioned biases due to the estimators’ agendas, each of these methods has 
limitations with regard to the inclusion of various forms of trafficking and its reliability 
in the estimate. 
At the global level, different studies have estimated the world illicit market at 
around 6% of total consumption in 1993, 8.5% in 1995, 10.7% in 2006, and 11.6% in 
2007.
31
 Although these estimates provide quite similar (and growing) values, they result 
from different approaches and different data of limited reliability. The only source 
providing yearly estimates of the illicit trade in tobacco products for a large number of 
countries (currently 80), is Euromonitor International (hereinafter EMI). EMI is a 
private company which publishes periodic reports on the global (and regional) illicit 
tobacco markets, estimating their size, revenues and related tax losses.
32
 For 2011, EMI 
estimated illicit cigarettes at 571.8 billion units, corresponding to 9% of the world 
market (a figure that rises to 11.5% when excluding the main national market, China).
33
 
However, EMI does not provide detailed information on the methodology used, and 
several studies have challenged the reliability of its estimates.
34
 
At the level of the European Union, Joossens and colleagues stated that the illicit 
market share was about 58 billion cigarettes in 2007 (8.5% of the total market).
35
 
Furthermore, a 2010 consumer survey on 17 EU countries and Albania reported that 
3.4% of consumers purchased cigarettes “from an individual selling cigarettes 
independently at local markets, delivery service, door-to-door, or just in the street”, 
while 8.4% of smokers purchased from the same channels at least 1% of their 
consumption in the previous 30 days.
36
 However, the authors acknowledged that the 
results may underestimate the size of the illicit market due to underreporting. To 
address this issue, the study also calculated a “tax evasion score” based on the 
characteristics of the cigarette packs shown by the consumers surveyed.
37
 The tax 
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evasion score across all the countries was 8.1%.
38
 The difference between the 
prevalence of smuggling reported by consumers and the tax evasion score further 
confirms the limited reliability of surveys for the measurement of the illicit trade. EMI 
provides national estimates of the ITTP for 25 out of 28 EU Member States, since there 
are no estimates for Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta. The estimates of the illicit market, 
still with no detail on the methodology used to calculate them, amounted to 67.3 bn 
cigarettes in 2007 (8.8% of total consumption) and 77.3 bn in 2012 (12.2% of total 
consumption).
39
  
Project Star provides a further estimate at the EU level. Since 2006, the project 
has provided annual estimates of the illicit tobacco market at a national and EU level, 
both in volume and as a percentage of the total market. Project Star is conducted by 
KPMG in furtherance of the agreements concluded among Philip Morris International, 
the European Commission, OLAF and the Member States to tackle the illicit trade.
40
 
The project is based on data on legal sales, consumer surveys and empty packs surveys 
(EPSs).
41
 EPSs are contracted out by the main tobacco manufacturers to different 
market analysis companies. In each country, they periodically collect a sample of 
littered cigarette packs in a number of medium and large cities. The surveys aim to 
assess the market shares of manufacturers and brands, and to measure the prevalence of 
non-domestic and counterfeit products. To this purpose, each pack is analyzed to 
identify the manufacturer, brand, country variant and whether it is a counterfeit. 
According to the last issue of Project Star, in 2012 the ITTP amounted to 65.5 bn 
cigarettes, i.e. 11.1% of total consumption. 
Some studies challenged the reliability of Project Star.
42
 Joossens and colleagues 
questioned the results, arguing that “the methodology for the collection of the empty 
packs in the report is insufficiently explained to judge its validity and that the report 
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relies heavily on expertise and data provided by the tobacco industry”.43 A study 
reviewing the methodology of Project Star argued that the study may “provide a useful 
contribution to the debate”, since “its strength lies in the production of a useful model 
and providing estimates […] independent of seizure data on which, despite their bias, 
such estimates are usually based”.44 However, the authors pointed out a number 
concerns about the methodology: lack of transparency and details on the data used in 
the model, overreliance on industry-produced data, risk of overestimation and the lack 
of external validation.
45
  
While most of the above concerns are important, Project Star still represents the 
best source of yearly estimates of the prevalence of the ITTP in the EU, enabling 
assessment of the evolution of the ITTP since 2006 through a constant methodology. 
With the exception of EMI’s opaque estimations, there is no other source providing 
annual figures for each EU country. The criticisms about the industry-supported EPSs 
often overlook that such sources also provide some advantages. For example, EPSs are 
currently conducted by independent market analysis companies for the four main 
manufacturers. The sample size is large (more than 10,000 packs per wave in most EU 
countries). Identification of counterfeits is conducted in cooperation with the 
manufacturers due to their expertise in the identification of the security features 
designed in the packs, a practice also common whenever law enforcement agencies 
seize large quantities of cigarettes. EPSs’ purpose is also to measure market shares and 
this may reduce the risk of biases when they are jointly conducted for the four main 
manufacturers. Lastly, in addition to possible industry biases, the lack of transparency 
about the methodology and results may also be due to other elements. For example, the 
data may disclose sensitive information which both manufacturers and market research 
may be reluctant to share with potential competitors. This is also common in other 
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industries (e.g. finance and insurance). At present, there is limited alternative to the use 
of industry data for the estimates, unless large-scale, independent data collection plans 
are enacted. 
Alternative, independent estimates appear unsatisfactory and/or are not 
conducted on a country-wide annual basis. Consumer surveys may be inadequate in 
evaluating illicit behaviors due to respondents’ biases.46 Independent pack collections, 
while providing more detail on the methodology, often rely on smaller samples.
47
 For 
example, three industry-funded waves of EPSs in Poland gathered 34,000 packs in 
August-September 2011, 34,000 in October-November 2011, and 17,000 packs in 
March-April of 2012 (the sample for the capital Warsaw was between 2800 and 5600 
packs per wave).
48
 In September 2011, Stoklosa and Ross conducted an independent 
survey, collecting only 754 packs in Warsaw.
49
 Overall, whereas the public and 
academic opinion should discuss its reliability and require full transparency on the 
methodology, there is little doubt that Project Star will most likely remain a point of 
reference for the estimation of the ITTP in the EU. 
The past and present of the ITTP in Italy 
The evolution of the illicit tobacco market in Italy 
Historically, the Italian illicit tobacco market has been characterized by some special 
elements which brought the ITTP to very high levels from the middle of the 1980s until 
the end of the 1990s.
50
 First, cigarette smuggling played an important role in the 
evolution of the Italian mafias (Camorra, Cosa Nostra and the Sacra Corona Unita). 
After World War II the illicit cigarette trade enabled Cosa Nostra and the Camorra to 
make considerable profits before the development of drug trafficking.
51
 Later, also the 
Sacra Corona Unita and criminal organizations from Puglia region became involved in 
11 
 
cigarette smuggling, opening new entry points for illicit tobacco on Italy’s south-eastern 
coasts.
52
  
Second, the business practices by tobacco manufacturers contributed to the illicit 
trade. These included, for example, the sale of products to some neighboring countries 
in quantities largely exceeding the domestic demand for cigarettes.
53
 The cigarettes 
were subsequently smuggled to Italy.  
Third, the authorities of the neighboring countries were actively involved in the 
smuggling schemes. For example, Montenegro (a part of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia since 1992 and of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro since 2003; an 
independent state since 3 June 2006) was one of the traditional destinations for 
cigarettes to be smuggled to Italy, which gained the country the nickname of “the 
Tortuga of the Adriatic Sea”.54 Since 1992, cigarettes were sold to broker companies 
based in a number of countries, and delivered to Montenegro, where they paid a low 
tax. Allegedly, the revenues generated by cigarette smuggling made up to sixty percent 
of the Montenegrin domestic product.
55
 The cigarettes were then smuggled to Italy with 
the cooperation of groups affiliated to the Sacra Corona Unita and the Camorra.
56
 
According to the Italian law enforcement and prosecution agencies, the authorities of 
Montenegro participated in the smuggling scheme, including the country’s leading 
politician, both Prime Minister and President during those years.
57
 Eventually, however, 
Italian authorities eventually dropped the charges in March 2009 due to problems of 
diplomatic immunity.
58
 
Since the middle of the 1990s, Italian authorities have adopted a number of 
measures to tackle cigarette smuggling. New legislation increased the penalties for 
cigarette smuggling and large scale law enforcement operations were launched, 
including the 2000 Operation Primavera (Springtime) which led to the arrest of more 
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than 500 individuals.
59
 Also, since 1991 the Italian government has increased its 
pressure on tobacco manufacturers, e.g. suspending the sales of a number of brands in 
1991 and 1992. In 1992 and 1998, it entered into two agreements with Philip Morris, 
the leading manufacturer on the Italian market.
60
 Whereas the Antimafia Parliamentary 
Commission contended that these agreements were unsatisfactory, in 2001 Italy, first 
among EU countries, joined the lawsuit filed by the European Commission in New 
York against PMI, which resulted in the above mentioned 2004 agreement.
61
 Lastly, 
changes in international politics led to an end of the Montenegrin connection. In fact, 
according to the Italian Antimafia Parliamentary Commission, until the end of the 1990s 
cigarette smuggling from Montenegro was tolerated for realpolitik reasons. Since 1996, 
Montenegrin authorities were opposing Slobodan Milosevic (President of Serbia until 
1997, then President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until 2000) in the period 
before the Kosovo War (February 1998- June 1999). After the war and the resignation 
of Milosevic in 2000, international support stopped, as demonstrated by the drop in the 
number of cases shipped to Montenegro (from 967,513 cases in 1998 to approximately 
103,344 cases in 2000).
62
 The combined effects of these measures induced a sharp 
decrease in the ITTP, to the point that Italy was considered a successful case at the 
international level.
63
  
Information on the ITTP in Italy today 
Today, according to law enforcement agencies, various criminal organizations, 
both domestic and foreign, dominate the ITTP in Italy. These groups would be the only 
ones able to organize the complex smuggling operation in its different phases. National 
and foreign organized criminals, often connected with the Italian mafias, would act as 
criminal enterprises, moving large quantities of cigarettes across seas and continents.
64
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The media and other sources reported that mafia proceeds from illicit tobacco would be 
€0.9 bn in 2010.65  
While presently available qualitative information on the ITTP highlights the 
important role of the mafias and organized crime, quantitative sources suggest a more 
complex picture. Existing estimates show that the Italian illicit tobacco market passed 
from high levels until the 1990s to very low ones at the beginning of the 2000s. In the 
most recent years, however, estimates have started to grow again (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Estimates of the illicit trade in tobacco products in Italy. Share of total 
consumption (1998-2012).  
 
Source: author’s elaboration  
Several consumer surveys were conducted between 2005 and 2010. Reported purchases 
from illicit channels remained constantly below 1%, and even 0% in 2010.
66
 The 2010 
survey also calculated the tax evasion score based on the features of the packs shown by 
the surveyed sample (1.5% of packs).
67
 In 2011, Nomisma issued a report on cigarette 
counterfeiting in Italy.
68
 The report estimated the illicit tobacco market for the years 
2009-2010 at about 2.8 billion cigarettes per year (3.2% of total consumption), with 413 
million (0.5%) and 2.4 billion units (2.7%) for counterfeits and contraband, 
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respectively. The report also estimated the value of the national illegal market, which 
amounted to over 651 million euros, i.e. 3.6% of total market value.
69
 The report, 
however, does not provide details on the methodology used.
70
 Project Star assessed the 
illicit market share in 2012 at 8.5% of total consumption.
71
 In the same year, EMI 
estimated the penetration of illicit tobacco at 5.8% of total consumption.
72
  
A further proxy for the illicit trade may be the prevalence of non-domestic packs 
in Italian empty pack surveys. Analysis of eight surveys conducted in the period 2009-
2012 shows the national prevalence of non-domestic packs ranging from 3.7% in the 
second quarter of 2009 to 9.9% and 9.6% in the second and fourth quarters of 2012, 
respectively (Figure 2). The use of EPSs as proxies of the illicit trade is controversial. 
First, they measure the prevalence of non-domestic packs, which include both legal 
illegal products. Further, the literature has pointed out a number of methodological 
uncertainties, also arguing that industry-sponsored EPSs may be biased by the 
industry’s interest in inflating the estimates of the ITTP.73 These concerns are important 
and further discussion of the reliability of the Italian EPSs is provided in the 
methodology section.  
Despite the caution due to the mentioned criticisms, EPSs are the only source 
assessing the illicit market penetration at the local level. This is particularly important, 
since the recent increase in non-domestic packs at the national level does not correspond 
to a general growth in all regions. Figure 2 shows different evolution patterns. While in 
some regions the trend of the non-domestic share was decreasing (e.g. Liguria, Calabria, 
Puglia) or stable (e.g. Emilia-Romagna), other regions registered a striking increase 
(Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Campania). The data suggest that non-domestic packs may 
reflect the trend in the illicit market, since tourist numbers do not have such a degree of 
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variation across years and do not concentrate in the regions with the highest non-
domestic prevalence.
74
  
Figure 2. Share of non-domestic packs out of total collected packs in empty pack 
surveys per region, quarter and year (2009-2012).  
 
Source: author’s elaboration  
Finally, seizure data do not reflect the penetration of the illicit trade in tobacco products. 
Data provided by the Guardia di Finanza (Italian financial police) for 2009-2012 show 
that seizures concentrate on land and sea borders (Figure 3). Furthermore, only a 
minority (between 28% and 35%) of the seized products are destined for Italy.
75
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Figure 3. Seizures of tobacco products by the Guardia di Finanza per year and province 
of the seizure (grams) (2009-2012).  
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
The review of the available information on the Italian illicit tobacco market 
points out a complex situation. While the media and official sources highlight the 
significant involvement of Italian and foreign criminal organizations in the ITTP, 
arguing that domestic mafias would earn nearly €1 bn from illicit tobacco, the existing 
evidence is partially at odds with the picture of a criminal market monopolized by the 
mafias and organized crime. It is so for several reasons. First, the illicit market has 
undergone significant changes in recent years. From high levels during the 1990s, it 
dropped to low ones at the beginning of the 2000s; in recent years, most available 
estimates suggest a growth of illicit consumption. This is somewhat in contrast with the 
constant presence of organized crime in the country. Second, the existing data on 
seizures and non-domestic packs suggest that the levels of illicit trade may not relate 
only to a strong presence of the mafias and other criminal organizations. Data on 
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seizures point out that the mafias are not the only actor at the wholesale distribution 
level. Most of the seizures in the last three years occurred in the port of Ancona, a city 
with low mafia presence. Conversely, ports where the mafias may have stronger control, 
such as in Naples, Bari, and Reggio Calabria, show an irregular trend in the seizures. 
The data on empty packs point out that, at the retail level, the ITTP may reach high 
levels in areas with and without strong mafia control. While Campania (region of origin 
of the Camorra) has high levels of non-domestic packs, Calabria and Sicilia (origin of 
the ‘Ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra respectively) are below the national average. Finally, 
the data also show significant changes in the ITTP across time and regions. For 
example, the prevalence of non-domestic packs in Naples passed from 8% in the fourth 
quarter of 2011 to 46% and 50% in the second and fourth quarter of 2012, respectively; 
in Rome, it passed from 3.5% in the second quarter of 2009 to 10% in the last quarter of 
the same year. 
The contrast between public opinion and empirical evidence is problematic and 
prevents better understanding of the functioning of the ITTP. There is a need for more 
studies on the factors driving the illicit market across time and space within the same 
country. However, such analyses require better estimates of the size of the illegal 
tobacco market providing regional estimates of the volume and revenues generated by 
the ITTP. This study aims to fill this gap by developing a methodology with which to 
estimate the regional volumes and revenues from the illicit cigarette market and 
applying it to Italy for the period 2009-2012.  
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Methodology to estimate the illicit cigarette market 
Data  
The methodology used to estimate the illicit cigarette market was mainly based 
on the national estimate of the ITTP in Italy by KPMG’s Project Star 2012 report, on 
empty pack surveys data provided by Philip Morris International, and other publicly 
available data (Table 1).
76
 The estimates refer merely to the cigarette market and 
exclude hand rolling tobacco (HRT), due to the lack of data.
77
  
Table 1. Data for estimating the illicit trade in tobacco products in Italy 
Variable  Description Disaggregation Years Source 
Smokers Sm 
Persons >13 years old 
who declare to smoke 
per 100 residents with 
the same 
characteristics 
Region 
2009-
2012 
I.Stat, ISTAT 
Inhabitants Pop 
Residents >13 years 
old at 31 December 
Region 
2009-
2012 
Geo Demo,  ISTAT 
Non–
domestic 
packs 
ND 
Discarded packs of 
foreign origin 
41 Italian cities 
2009-
2012 
Empty packs 
surveys by 
MSIntelligence, 
provided by PMI 
Illicit 
market  
IM 
Contraband and 
counterfeiting 
National 
2009-
2012 
KPMG
78
 
Prices in 
illicit 
market 
P Price per pack n/a n/a 
Press, open sources 
and contact with 
stakeholders 
 
Given the above mentioned concerns about the use of industry-related sources, 
the choice of KPMG’s Project Star and EPSs data was mainly due to the lack of 
comparable alternatives.  
Despite the already mentioned criticisms to its methodology, Project Star is the 
only source of annual estimates of the ITTP in Italy through the application of the same 
model. Its usefulness was recently acknowledged even in the very critical review by 
Gilmore and colleagues.
79
 The adoption of different estimates as a starting point would 
have yielded different results. However, alternative sources were discarded for several 
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reasons: some estimates referred to a short time period and were outdated (e.g. 
Nomisma); the information available on the methodology used to obtain some estimates 
did not allow assessment of their reliability (e.g. EMI); consumer surveys are not 
available at subnational level and are unreliable on sensitive issues, such as the purchase 
of illicit products. The selection of Project Star’s national figures as a starting point does 
not disregard the problems of the method proposed by KPMG. There is the need of 
alternative, independent and fully transparent estimates of the ITTP. Yet, until 
significant investments are made in this direction, Project Star is likely to remain the 
only available source. As the main goal of this study was to create a methodology 
providing annual estimates of the ITTP at the subnational level, future better estimates 
at the national level may replace Project Star’s figures. 
Industry-sponsored EPSs have a number of advantages and disadvantages. 
Among the advantages, EPSs have large samples and are repeated periodically. The 
Italian surveys gather and analyze a sample of 10,000 cigarettes packs from all the 41 
cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants (covering 16 out of 20 regions) two times a 
year (every second and fourth quarter, thus avoiding the summertime, which may be 
biased by tourist in- and outflows). The collection plans are designed to cover different 
parts of the cities. Each city is divided into 5 sectors (North, South, East West, and 
Center), and each sector is broken down into circular areas of 500m radius. To ensure 
the statistical robustness of the sample, a sample of thirty packs is collected in each 
area.
80
 For example, Figure 4 shows the collection areas for the city of Milan. The 
surveys cover most of the residential areas of the city, avoiding concentration in the city 
center (where tourist presence may boost the prevalence of non-domestic packs) and 
areas of lower socio-economic conditions (where illicit consumption may be higher). 
Furthermore, EPSs are based on the actual packs and do not rely on consumers’ 
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perceptions and willingness to report. Currently, pack analysis enables identification of 
manufacturer, brand, country variant and whether the pack is counterfeit or an illicit 
white brand. This information enables some distinction among different types of illicit 
trade (contraband, counterfeit and illicit whites). Lastly, the most important advantage is 
that EPSs are the only source providing insight into city and regional differences in the 
prevalence of non-domestic packs, which enable the elaboration of estimates at the 
subnational level.  
Figure 4. Collection points for the empty packs surveys in the city of Milan (2011-
2012).  
Source: author’s elaboration  
The literature has pointed out several disadvantages of industry-sponsored 
EPSs.
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 First, the surveys measure the prevalence of non-domestic products, which 
inevitably include legitimately purchased cigarettes (e.g. by foreign tourists or nationals 
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traveling abroad). Also, EPSs exclude illicit domestic products (e.g. contraband 
cigarettes of Italian variants) which may underestimate the illicit market. However, 
there seems to be no practicable method for a more precise identification of illicit 
products, as “it is impossible to discriminate between smuggled goods, legal cross-
border purchases and illegal cross-border purchases. The only possible distinction that 
can be made thanks to [pack surveys] is between counterfeit packs and others”.82 
Indeed, other independent surveys analyzed whether packs bore tax stamps required for 
the sale in the place of collection. This approach however focuses on tax avoidance 
(whether local taxes were paid or not), which may also be the result of legal 
purchases.
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 For this reason, the share non-domestic products should not be considered 
as a direct estimate of the illicit market, particularly in countries with high cigarette 
prices and regions bordering countries with lower prices.
84
 Yet, notwithstanding these 
issues, the share of non-domestic products may be considered a good of approximation 
of the prevalence of illicit tobacco within the same country. 
Second, the literature remarked that the information on the methodology is 
incomplete. The samples should be representative of the national population, while in 
some cases they may over-represent areas of particular interest for the manufacturers. 
Surveys are conducted only in large and medium cities and there is insufficient 
information on the criteria for the selection of the streets. Some have contended that 
these methodological steps may be designed to inflate the prevalence of non-domestic 
packs, due to a higher presence of tourists, foreign students, and people of lower socio-
economic conditions.
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 While these concerns are important, the above exposed details 
on the methodology of the Italian EPSs suggest that the results should be reliable and 
also more robust than some independent surveys, where only a few packs where 
collected in some of the sampled city areas.
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 Inspection of the collection areas of 
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industry-sponsored EPSs in the city of Milan showed a preference towards residential, 
non-peripheral and non-tourist areas (Figure 4). Furthermore, most of the limitations of 
current surveys are also due to their costs in terms of money and time. According to 
PMI, each EPSs wave costs more than € 70,000. Coverage of rural areas and more 
detailed analyses on packs may significantly increase the costs of the surveys.  
Third, EPSs exclude other tobacco products such as hand rolling tobacco, and do 
not include homes and workplaces. These limitations are likely due to feasibility and 
cost constraints.  
Lastly, the use of industry-sponsored sources may inadvertently support the 
policy agenda of tobacco manufacturers, accused of exploiting the issue of illicit trade 
for their commercial purposes.
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 However, the Italian EPSs are collected using a 
specifically designed methodology which does not appear aimed at inflating the 
prevalence of non-domestic products, e.g. by focusing on specific hotspot cities, tourist 
areas or neighborhoods with low socio-economic conditions. Whereas the industry 
should be more transparent on the methodology of the EPSs and should improve the 
quality of the data, the surveys are currently the only available annual source on the 
consumption of non-domestic cigarettes.  
The above considerations suggest that EPSs data should be treated with caution 
and that further efforts are needed to refine their methodologies. Yet, the available 
information on the Italian EPSs point out that these data can be used as a proxy of the 
regional prevalence of the illicit market. As already argued, this study has adopted EPSs 
due to the lack of better alternatives. If new, independent, and more reliable proxies 
become available, they may be integrated in the methodology with limited effort.  
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Estimates 
This study estimated the volumes and revenues of the illicit cigarette market for the 
period 2009-2012 owing to the availability of data for these years. 
For every year, the national illicit market (IMnat) as estimated by KPMG was 
divided among the Italian regions in proportion to the number of smokers, in turn 
obtained by multiplying the percentage of smokers (Smreg) by the population >13 years 
old in each region (Popreg). 
IMreg =
IMnat·  Smreg· Popreg
 Smnat · Popnat
 
The resulting IMreg estimated the regional size of the ITTP, assuming that all regions 
have the same prevalence of illicit tobacco consumption. This assumption, however, 
appears implausible: the analysis of the Italian EPSs presented in Figure 2 highlighted 
that non-domestic packs are distributed unequally across the country, which may 
suggest that illicit consumption may be concentrated unevenly.   
The IMreg were adjusted to account for these differences in the regional illicit 
consumption. The proxy for the regional levels of illicit trade was the regional share of 
"non-domestic" packs collected by empty pack surveys (NDreg). The regional share was 
the average of the non-domestic share in the two surveys per year (one in the second 
quarter and one in the last quarter). The non-domestic share was the ratio between the 
sum of non-domestic packs and the sum of the total packs collected in all the cities in a 
region.
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The regional illicit markets were weighted for the ratio between the ND in the 
region and the average of the regional ND share. To return the sum of the regional illicit 
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markets to the national total, the values were divided by their sum and multiplied by 
IMnat, obtaining the regional illicit markets adjusted (IMadjreg).
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IMadj
reg
= IMreg·
NDreg
avg. ND
reg
·
IMnat
∑ IMreg·
NDreg
NDnat
 
Regional revenues from the illicit trade in tobacco products (IMrevreg) were obtained by 
dividing the values of IMadjreg by 20 (the most sold pack size in Italy) and multiplying 
the result by the price of an illicit 20-cigarette pack. After reviewing open sources and 
press releases, and after interviewing stakeholders (law enforcement, prosecution and 
industry experts), the study adopted a minimum illicit price of €2.75 and a maximum 
one of €3.5 per 20-cigarette pack. The selection of these prices is reasonable, since they 
are below the prices of the most popular brands in Italy. During the same period, the 
price of a 20-cigarette pack of Marlboro (the most sold brand in Italy) rose from €4.3 
(2008) to €5 (end 2012).90 This is also in line with the range of prices of illicit cigarettes 
identified by Joossens and colleagues.
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IMrevregmax=
IMadj
reg
20
· €3.5 
IMrevregmin=
IMadj
reg
20
· €2.75  
Results and discussion 
Table 2 shows the regional estimates of the volumes and revenues of the ITTP for the 
period 2009-2012. The national revenues from the ITTP increased by nearly 2.5 times 
during the period observed, rising from €532 mn in 2009 (max estimate) to €1,275mn in 
2012 (max estimate). The estimated volumes of the illicit market correspond to 
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significant tax losses. The revenue loss for the Italian government in the period was 
approximately €423 mn in 2009, €650 mn in 2010, €739 mn in 2011, and €1,184 mn in 
2012, totaling €2,995.92 Considering that the total tax collected in Italy on cigarettes is 
in the range of €14,000 mn per year, the ITTP may have an impact of up to 
approximately 8.5% of the total revenues from cigarettes.
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Table 3. Estimates of the volume (mn sticks) and minimum/maximum revenues (mn€) 
of the illicit tobacco market by Italian region (2009-2012). 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 Volume Revenue Volume Revenue Volume Revenue Volume Revenue 
 IMadj IMrevmin IMrevmax IMadj IMrevmin IMrevmax IMadj IMrevmin IMrevmax IMadj IMrevmin IMrevmax 
Abruzzo  141.5 19.5 24.8 58.7 8.1 10.3 52.0 7.2 9.1 166.2 22.9 29.1 
Basilicata  22.6 3.1 4.0 43.8 6.0 7.7 42.4 5.8 7.4 31.7 4.4 5.5 
Calabria  46.9 6.5 8.2 109.3 15.0 19.1 80.5 11.1 14.1 84.2 11.6 14.7 
Campania  310.4 42.7 54.3 470.6 64.7 82.4 637.2 87.6 111.5 
2085.
7 
286.8 365.0 
Emilia-
Romagna  
261.7 36.0 45.8 259.1 35.6 45.4 247.3 34.0 43.3 325.3 44.7 56.9 
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia  
125.7 17.3 22.0 95.7 13.2 16.7 127.8 17.6 22.4 370.8 51.0 64.9 
Lazio  397.8 54.7 69.6 286.6 39.4 50.2 307.5 42.3 53.8 416.3 57.2 72.9 
Liguria  101.4 13.9 17.7 122.4 16.8 21.4 107.6 14.8 18.8 85.3 11.7 14.9 
Lombardia  365.0 50.2 63.9 
1107.
0 
152.2 193.7 
1143.
0 
157.2 200.0 
1124.
3 
154.6 196.8 
Marche  90.9 12.5 15.9 123.5 17.0 21.6 194.2 26.7 34.0 116.7 16.0 20.4 
Molise  18.8 2.6 3.3 19.7 2.7 3.5 18.5 2.5 3.2 25.6 3.5 4.5 
Piemonte  204.2 28.1 35.7 348.8 48.0 61.0 437.7 60.2 76.6 412.0 56.7 72.1 
Puglia  123.5 17.0 21.6 429.6 59.1 75.2 208.6 28.7 36.5 225.3 31.0 39.4 
Sardegna  95.3 13.1 16.7 115.2 15.8 20.2 118.3 16.3 20.7 174.1 23.9 30.5 
Sicilia  139.3 19.2 24.4 261.6 36.0 45.8 197.9 27.2 34.6 466.7 64.2 81.7 
Toscana  218.1 30.0 38.2 282.5 38.8 49.4 195.8 26.9 34.3 327.6 45.0 57.3 
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 
30.1 4.1 5.3 77.0 10.6 13.5 131.1 18.0 22.9 94.2 13.0 16.5 
Umbria  75.5 10.4 13.2 70.0 9.6 12.2 90.7 12.5 15.9 63.9 8.8 11.2 
Valle d'Aosta  4.8 0.7 0.8 8.9 1.2 1.6 8.9 1.2 1.6 8.7 1.2 1.5 
Veneto  266.5 36.6 46.6 259.8 35.7 45.5 463.0 63.7 81.0 685.4 94.2 119.9 
Italy 3040 418.0 532.0 4550 625.6 796.3 4810 661.4 841.7 7290 
1002.
4 
1275.
8 
Source: author’s calculations 
Over the years, the largest regional illicit markets changed among the most populated 
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Italian regions (Lazio in 2009, Lombardia in 2010 and 2011, Campania in 2012) (Figure 
5, left map). The values were normalized by the smoking population to take the 
different sizes of the regions into account (Figure 5, right map). At the national level, 
the illicit trade rose from an equivalent of 12.6 20-cigarette packs per smoker in 2009 to 
32.2 in 2012.
94
 Among the regions, in the four years considered, only Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia always recorded normalized volumes higher than the national ones. Three other 
regions had higher values in three out of four years (Campania, Marche and Veneto). In 
part, the estimates for Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Marche may be due to the data, since 
the EPSs for these regions surveyed only the regional capitals of Trieste and Ancona, 
which are located on the coast and close to countries with lower cigarette prices. 
These figures suggest that the regional prevalence of the ITTP is mostly related 
to the availability of illicit tobacco due to the proximity to countries with lower prices or 
to the presence of large transport infrastructures. Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Veneto are 
close to Slovenia, where cigarettes are cheaper.
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 While consumers may legitimately 
purchase cigarettes in the neighboring country, the easy access provides also an 
opportunity for the development of small scale contraband or bootlegging. The removal 
of border controls between Italy and Slovenia (due to the European Union policies) may 
have further reduced the risks for individuals willing to engage in the ITTP. For 
example, it may be possible to drive a car across the border, fill it with cigarette cartons, 
and re-enter Italy with a very low risk of being controlled. Furthermore, all the above-
mentioned four regions have important ports (Trieste, Venice, Ancona and Naples), 
which may function as important gateways for the entry of illicit tobacco into Italy. This 
may also make illicit products more available in the port cities.  
The findings also suggest that the mafias may be an important driver of the 
ITTP, although not the only one. In Campania, the significant growth of the illicit trade 
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in 2012 suggests a correlation with the strong presence of the Camorra, a mafia with a 
consolidated expertise in cigarette smuggling. The sudden increase in a single year, 
however, points out that mafia control alone is not a sufficient condition. More 
probably, the Camorra has been able to exploit its traditional expertise in cigarette 
smuggling, but also some criminal opportunities which have occurred in 2012. For 
example, new methods of smuggling may have been adopted in the port of Naples, as 
signaled by an increase of the seizures, although inferior to the increase of the estimated 
prevalence of illicit cigarettes. Other regions with a traditionally strong presence of the 
mafias (Sicily, Calabria and Puglia) did not show a similar growth pattern. Also the 
seizures in the main ports of these regions had irregular trends, despite the strong mafia 
control over the cities of Palermo and Reggio Calabria. The differences across 
traditional mafia regions may further confirm that the mafias are not a sufficient 
condition for the development of large illicit markets.
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The estimates of the ITTP were high also in regions with a very low presence of 
the mafias. Contrary to Campania, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Veneto and Marche had a very 
low presence of mafias, but high estimates of the ITTP.
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 This confirms that the 
presence of the mafias is not only insufficient, but unnecessary for the development of 
the ITTP at the regional level. As discussed above, the causes of the consumption of 
illicit cigarettes in these regions may be due to the proximity to Slovenia.  
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Figure 5. Illicit cigarette market per region in value (minimum estimates, mn€) and 
equivalent 20-cigarette packs per smoker (2009-2012).  
 
Source: author’s calculations 
Another significant characteristic is the growth pattern of the ITTP across the years. 
From 2009 to 2011, the regional values were concentrated around the average (average 
packs per smoker 13.99, 18.54 and 20.89, with st. dev of 5.69, 4.39 and 8.41, 
respectively). This reveals a general increase in most regions. In 2012, the growth was 
significant, mainly due to three already-mentioned regions: Friuli-Venezia Giulia and 
Campania exceeded 80 packs per smoker, while Veneto went up to 41 (2012 regional 
average was 29.35, st. dev 19.67). Without these regions, the national increase would 
have been in the range of approximately 1 pack per smoker.  
The estimation of the revenue generated by the ITTP does not provide support to 
the claim that in 2010 the mafias would have gained up to €0.9 bn from illicit 
cigarettes.
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 The total estimated revenues at the retail level for the same year range 
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between €625 mn and €796 mn, well below the alleged mafia revenues. Furthermore, 
not all such revenues should be attributed to the mafias, given the variety of actors 
which may be involved in the different stages of the illicit market.  
Overall, the application of the proposed methodology to Italy call for the 
adoption of different policy measures for the prevention and control of the ITTP. In the 
regions close to Slovenia, better controls may be implemented to ensure that cheaper 
foreign cigarettes are not smuggled into the country. Probably, this may require more 
efforts in the cooperation between Italian and Slovenian authorities. In Campania, 
further analyses should identify the opportunities which triggered the boom of the illicit 
market in 2012. For example, the implementation of new tracking systems within the 
port of Naples may contribute to effectively reduce the risk of smuggling. Also, further 
research should assess whether the illicit trade in the region is controlled, at least in part, 
by the Camorra, given the solid expertise of this mafia in the smuggling of cigarettes. 
Conclusions 
This study has described a methodology for the estimation of the illicit cigarette 
market at the subnational level. The methodology is based mainly on data produced 
with the financial support of the tobacco industry. The review of available alternatives 
highlighted that independent sources do not allow estimation of the regional prevalence 
across different years and have problems of reliability (e.g. consumers survey are likely 
to underestimate illicit consumption, due to respondents’ underreporting). Concerns 
about possible biases by the tobacco industry are legitimate and should not be 
underestimated. The tobacco industry should be more transparent on the methodologies 
adopted in the study it supports, which would also contribute to its attempts to present 
itself as a reliable partner in the fight against illicit tobacco. Since the development of 
independent measurements with a level of detail comparable to that of industry-
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supported sources appears far to come, at present the latter ones provide the only 
possibility to estimate the prevalence of the ITTP at the subnational level across 
different years and countries.  
Notwithstanding the possible limitations of the data, the proposed estimation 
method requires a relatively limited number of sources. The starting points were Project 
Star’s national estimates of the illicit trade (currently available for 27 EU Member 
States), which may be replaced by other, independent assessments whenever they will 
be developed. Data for the regional estimation are the smoking population and non-
domestic packs found by empty pack surveys. The former data are normally available, 
while the EPSs are conducted by the tobacco manufacturers in a number of countries 
and disseminated through media and reports, but often in aggregated form. Also EPSs 
data may be replaced with better data, if available. The limited requirements in terms of 
data may allow application of the method to other countries, which may provide insight 
into the regional prevalence of the illicit cigarette market across time and space.  
Application of the method to Italian regions from 2009 to 2012 yielded insight 
into the chronological and spatial evolution of the ITTP. Indeed, while most publicly 
available estimates are at the national level, the regional estimates for Italy reveal that 
the illicit trade varies significantly across time and regions. The results show that the 
increase at the national level was driven by a general growth across most regions in the 
first three years, and by an increase concentrated in only three regions in 2012. Also, the 
analysis points out that a strong presence of the mafias in a region is not a sufficient 
condition for the growth of the ITTP. This contrasts with the opinion of the media and 
public agencies, which frequently attributes the illicit tobacco trade to organized crime. 
This suggests that illicit cigarettes have a complex market which is influenced by a 
number of factors.  
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